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SCOPE OF JUDICIAL REVIEW OF RAILROAD COMMISSION ORDERST WO cases' were decided in 1947 which bear upon the elusive
"substantial evidence rule." This rule is the principle of
administrative law which is said to define and limit the scope
within which the courts may review rules and orders made by the
Railroad Commission in regulating the oil and gas industry.
These Civil Appeals decisions were both affirmed by the
Supreme Court in 1948,2 each case resulting in the cancellation
of a permit to drill an oil well as ant exception to Rule 37. Only
the Supreme Court's opinions will be considered here.' Their
effect cannot be appreciated without a preliminary examination
of the rule as it previously existed.
Section 8 of Article 6049c provides that interested persons
aggrieved by orders or regulations of the Commission
"... shall have a right to file a suit in a court of competent jurisdic-
tion in Travis County ... to test the validity of said laws, rules, regula.
tions, or orders. Such suit shall be advanced for trial. In all such trials,
the burden of proof shall be upon the party complaining... and such
law, rule, regulation or order ... shall be deemed prima facie valid."'4
(Italics supplied.)
In 1939 the Supreme Court first stated what is now known
as the substantial evidence rule, in Gulf Land Co. v. Atlantic
Refining Co.': orders of the Commission should not be upset
unless illegal, unreasonable, or arbitrary and an order does not
I Humble Oil & Refining Co. v. Wrather, 205 S. W. (2d) 86 (Tex. Civ. App. 1947)
error granted; Hawkins v. The Texas Co., 203 S. W. (2d) 1003 (Tex. Civ. App. 1947)
error granted.
2 Wrather v. Humble Oil & Refining Co .... Tex.. S. W. (2d) -- (1948);
Hawkins v. Texas Co. -- Tex. -, 209 S. W. (2d) 338 (1948).
8 Although this survey is primarily limited to the year 1947, it is thought that these
1948 affirmances should be included.
' Tx. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. (Vernon's 1925) art. 6049c, § 8.
5134 Tex. 59, 131 S. W. (2d) 73 (1939).
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possess such character if it is ".... reasonably supported by sub-
stantial evidence." This phraseology has been repeated by all the
cases, but the court made other statements which have not been so
followed: that the Commission should have power to ".... finally
determine controverted issues of fact..."; that although orders
of the Commission might be supported on legal grounds not recited
by the agency as a basis for the order, this did not mean that the
district court could determine material controverted, fact ques-
tions not passed upon by the Commission. Such a holding, it
was asserted, would violate the "rule" that the Commission finally
determines all fact issues and destroy uniformity of Commis-
sion administration. In this case the issue was confiscation and
the facts were undisputed. The permit was cancelled, the court
holding, as a matter of law, that it was not supported by substan-
tial evidence.
In 1942 the opinion in the Trem Carr case' was delivered by
the late Chief Justice Alexander, cancelling a permit which bad
been granted as an exception to prevent waste. The Commission
contended that it should take testimony and make fact findings
which should be accepted without an independent hearing of the
evidence and be binding upon the courts if supported by any sub-
stantial evidence in the record. The Chief Justice said that the
question had been previously settled to the contrary in Magnolia
Petroleum Co. v. New Process Co.' and the Century case.' He
stated that the doctrine that administrative findings should be
conclusive if supported by substantial evidence originated in
express federal statutes, was foreign to Texas law, had never
been sanctioned by the Texas legislature, and he strongly inti-
mated that such a statute would contravene the Texas Consti-
tution. He then examined Article 6049c, Section 8, saying that
the word "trial" therein connotates a judicial examination of the
o Railroad Commission v. Shell Oil Co., 139 Tex. 66, 161 S. W. (2d) 1022 (1942).
T 129 Tex. 617, 104 S. W. (2d) 1106 (1937).8 Railroad Commission v. Magnolia Petroleum Co., 130 Tex. 484, 109 S. W. (2d)
967 (1937).
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evidence; that there would be no necessity for placing the "burden
of proof" if it had not been intended that proof be heard, and
concluded that the statute clearly contemplates that the evidence
be heard de novo in the district court. Otherwise the Commission
might reject material evidence or admit that which is inadmis-
sible. The Chief Justice pointed out the enormous power which
the Commission would have if it could bind the courts in such
a manner and the dangerous consequences thereof. He then
repeated the rule: that the courts will not disturb a Commission
order which is rcasonably supported by substantial evidence,
but he added that the issue is not whether the agency came to
the proper fact conclusion but
'hether or not it arted arl-itrarih. and Nithout regard to the
facts .... This does not mean that a mere svinlilla of eiidenre uill stif-
ice, nor ... that the court is Iound to select the testimony of one side
with absolute blindness to the other. After all, the court is to renderjustice in the case. The record is to I-e considered as a %%hole. and it is
for the court to determine what constitutes s iistantial evidence.... If
the evidence is such that reasonalble minds could n6t have reached the
coluvhsi.,l that the agency nmst have rea'hed in order to justify its
action, then the order imust I'e set aside.
The Trem Carr case construes Gulf v. Atlantic to mean that
there must be a new and independent trial in court wherein all
evidence introduced at the trial and the credibility of the wit-
nesses should he considered in determining whether the Com-
mission's order is supported by substantial evidence. This was
not made clear in Gulf v. Atlantic. The Trem Carr case does not
say that there should be a jury trial, or even a decision by the
court based upon a preponderance of the evidence. It says that
the permit should be upheld if reasonably supported by sub-
stantial evidence upon the record as a whole. The evidence must
be such that, in an ordinary jury trial, a directed verdict would
not be proper.
In 1944 Chief Justice Alexander again delivered a unanimous
0 139 Tex. 66, 79, 161 S. W. (2d) 1022, 1029-30 (1942).
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decision in Marrs v. Railroad Commission," where confiscation
was involved. In holding the proration order there attacked to be
a violation of due process the court said:
"It is clear... that it (the legislature) ... intended that there should
be a 'trial' of the issues in court, and no limitation is placed upon the
sort of trial to be had, except that it must be one to test the validity of
the order, and the burden of proof is upon the one complaining thereof.
A 'trial' as commonly understood contemplates a judicial examination
of all the issues of law and fact. There cannot be a judicial examination
without the right to pass upon the credibility of the witnesses and the
weight to be given to the evidence.
".... this suit was brought both as a statutory suit under Art. 6049c,
Section 8, to test the validity of... proration orders and as a bill in
equity to restrain the Commission from restricting production ... in
such a manner as to constitute taking of the plaintiff's property with-
out due process of law.
".... upon the trial ... the court had the right to hear the evidence.
... In passing on such issues the court had the right to pass on the cred-
ibility of the witnesses and the weight to be given to the evidence.
"... in suits brought to set aside an order, rule, or regulation on the
ground that it violates one's constitutional rights ... the law contem-
plates an independent review of the facts by the court as in other civil
actions...
"This is not a case of mere waste in which the Commission has exer-
cised the sound discretion invested in it to conserve our natural re-
sources... the orders here complained of have the effect of taking one's
property under circumstances where the evidence shows that this is not
necessary in order to conserve natural resources.
"The record... contains evidence legally sufficient to show confisca-
tion of property... in such a case our Constitution guarantees a trial of
such issues as in other civil cases.
"In making this ruling we in no wise question or overrule anything
said by the court in either... (Railroad Commission v. Shell Oil Co. or
Gulf Land Co. v. Atlantic Refining Co.)."
This seems to both broaden and approve the rule of the Trem
Carr case. In the trial de novo the court should, under this case,
place its own values upon the testimony. Apparently the court
did not consider the Trem Carr and Gulf-Atlantic cases as con-
flicting, since it gives inferential approval to both.
10 142 Tex. 293, 177 S. W. (2d) 941 (1944).
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Note the emphasis in the Marrs case on the proposition that
in cases involving constitutional rights there is a necessity for
full judicial review, and the reference to the fact that the suit
in question was also a bill in equity and not merely a statutory
action under Article 6049c.
In 1946 Thomas v. Stanolind Oil Co." and Trapp v. Shell
Oil Co." were decided on the same day. In both permits had
been granted as exceptions to prevent waste and confiscation, but
the facts show that in each case the principal issue was whether
the permittee was at a drainage disadvantage and being deprived
of the opportunity to recover his fair share of the oil beneath
his tract; therefore the problem involved was confiscation."
In each case the trial court had cancelled the permit and the
Court of Civil Appeals hads affirmed. In both instances the
Supreme Court reversed the lower courts and rendered judg-
ment upholding the permits. In each Chief Justice Alexander
dissented. In the Thomas case his dissent is upon the ground
that the judgment of the trial court was ".... undoubtedly in
accordance with the overwhelming weight of the evidence," and
the reader is referred by the Chief Justice to his dissent in the
Trapp case for his reasoning. In the majority opinion in that
case the court begins by quoting extensively from the Gulf.
Atlantic, Trem Carr, and Marrs cases and it recognizes the dif-
ference between the rules as expressed by the first and the latter
two. It then makes the statement that the ". . rules announced
in the Gulf-Atlantic case are now the prevailing rules... notwith-
standing the conflicting statements in the Trem Carr and Marrs
cases." The court recognized that much of what was said in the
Gulf case was dictum, and answered that the same is true of the
Trem Carr case, but that the statement in the Marrs case that
the two earlier decisions were. not thereby overruled cannot be
11 145 Tex. 270, 198 S. W. (2d) 420 (1946).
12 145 Tex. 323, 198 S. W. (2d) 424 (1946).
is Gulf Land Co. v. Atlantic Refining Co., 134 Tex. 54, 131 S. W. (2d) 73.
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classed as dictum. Then, after expressly approving the Gulf-
Atlantic case, the court says that the district court
"... was not required to close its eyes to fraud or sham. The sub-
stantial evidence rule does not mean that the parties are limited to the
evidence taken by and before the Railroad Commission. The parties
may ... introduce any relevant legal testimony in the district court. ...
The trial court does not have to consider incredible, perjured, or unrea-
sonable testimony because such evidence is not substantial.
"We shall not attempt to formulate a comprehensive definition of the
rule, but it is believed that the court made a fair statement of the rule
in the Trem Carr .... .. " (Italics supplied.)
Chief Justice Alexander, in his dissent, interprets the majority
opinion as binding the courts if there is any substantial evi-
dence, and as preventing them from passing upon the credibility
or weight to be given testimony in determining whether it is sub-
stantial. He admits that the Commission may be given discretion
to determine how waste shall be prevented, if it is first shown
that oil is being wasted, but, in his view, the fallacy of the major-
ity is in their failure to distinguish this from the right of the
courts to determine whether the order amounts to confiscation.
Among other cases, he cites Crowell v. Benson,"' Ohio Valley
Water Co. v. Ben Avon Borough,"6 and Lone Star Gas Co. v.
State" as upholding his contention that where a constitutional
right is involved
"... the owner (is) entitled to a fair opportunity for submitting that
issue to a judicial tribunal for determination upon its own independentjudgment as to both law and facts.""8
In Hawkins v. The Texas Co. and Wrather v. Humble, decided
four months later, the Supreme Court affirmed decisions of the
Court of Civil Appeals which had upheld trial court decrees
"1
14 145 Te. 323, 349, 198 S. W. (2d) 424, 440 (1946).
Is285 U. S. 22 (1932).
1s 253 U. S. 287 (1920).
IT 137 Te. 279, 153 S. W. (2d) 681 (1941).
18 285 U. S. 22, 60 (1932).
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cancelling permits granted as exceptions to prevent waste. There
was considerable testimony in each case which, at first blush,
appears conflicting, but in each case the court convincingly con-
strues that testimony as merely an argument in favor of the
"more wells, more oil" theory, which was discredited in the
Trem Carr case. It follows the holding of that case, that this
argument is not substantial evidence to support a waste excep-
tion, and that, since there was no showing of unusual local con-
ditions the permits could not be valid. This is the extent of the
Supreme Court's discussion of the substantial evidence rule in
Wrather v. Humble, but in the Hawkins case the court discerns
a misconception of the meaning of "substantial evidence" in the
permitee's brief and undertakes to correct this error.
Hawkins, quoting from the dissenting opinion of the late
Chief Justice in the Trapp case, contended that under the major-
ity opinion in that case, as soon as one witness testified to facts
which would support the permit the court would be powerless
to upset it. The Supreme Court said:
"The substantial evidence rule does not mean that...
".. . the finding of the Commission will be sustained.., if it is rea-
sonably supported by substantial evidence, meaning evidence intro.
duced in court. The word 'reasonably' has been deliberately used in the
statement and its use gives to judicial review a broader scope than it
would have if some substantial evidence were regarded as sufficient of
itself to sustain the Commission's order. It is for the court to determine
as a matter of law the reasonableness of the support afforded by sub-
stantial evidence...(citing the Thomas and Trapp cases).
"... the court examines and takes into consideration all of the evi-
dence, the entire record. (citing Trapp v. Shell Oil Co.) ... (otherwise)
there would be no real review and no trial in court. It clearly appears
from... Art. 6049c that there must be a trial in court.... This...
does not mean a trial as of an ordinary civil suit in which tho court
makes its own findings based upon a preponderance of the evidence
before it. Nevertheless, it means that there shall be a trial and in that
trial the court determines from all the evidence before it, the entire
record, whether the Commission's action is or is not reasonably sup.
ported by substantial evidence. The foregoing is a reiteration of the
[Vol. 2
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... rule made in Railroad Commission v. Shell Oil Co., the Trem Carr
case, which was quoted with approval in the Trapp case....",9
This, then, is the present state of the law: on appeal from
orders of the Railroad Commission evidence is heard anew in the
district court. The court weighs this evidence and determines
whether the order is substantially supported thereby, so as not
to be arbitrary, unreasonable, or illegal. A jury trial is not avail-
able to the litigant, but the scope of appellate review is broader
than in ordinary civil suits.2" Both the Court of Civil Appeals
and the Supreme Court may examine the entire record, de novo,
without regard to holdings of inferior courts, and determine
whether substantial evidence existed to reasonably support the
Commission's order, since this is a matter of law.
It may still be possible to obtain an ordinary trial in the dis-
trict court, with a jury, by filing an independent bill in equity and
alleging that property is being taken without due process of law.
The Trapp, Thomas, and Hawkins cases dealt only with statutory
review. In Marrs v. Railroad Commission the court seemed to
recognize that where an action is brought in equity due process
requires more than the statutory review, and this part of that
case has never been overruled. If confiscation is specifically
raised in a suit in equity, the Ben Avon Borough case and
numerous other decisions of the United States Supreme Court will
also support the position that an ordinary trial de novo as to both
law and fact is a matter of right.2
19.__ Tex. 209 S. W. (2d) 338, 340 (1948).
2 0 The Supreme Court's jurisdiction on appeal is limited to questions of law. There-
fore it may not consider the entire record in ordinary civil suits, and the Courts of Civil
Appeals are generally bound by findings of the trial court as to questions of fact unless
such findings are manifestly against the weight of evidence.
21 These cases are still followed, but have been slightly modified. In St. Joseph Stock-
yards v. U. S., 298 U. S. 38 (1935), the Supreme Court said that where the issue is con-
fiscation a court is not bound to accept administrative findings even though they are
supported by substantial evidence, but that the burden is upon the person complaining of
the administrative -action to make a convincing showing, and that a court will not
interfere with the order attacked unless confiscation is clearly established.
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SCOPE OF RAILROAD COMMISSION'S AUTHORITY TO PREVENT
WASTEFUL FLARING OF CASINGHEAD GAS
In Railroad Commission v. Shell Oil Co.22 the Railroad Com-
mission issued an order prohibiting the flaring of gas and direct-
ing producers in the Seeligson Field to shut down their oil wells
unless and until the gas, produced as an incident to the recovery
of oil, was put to one of the following beneficial uses: (1) light
or fuel; (2) efficient manufacture of chemicals other than car-
bon black; (3) repressuring; (4) extraction therefrom of natural
gasoline and re-injection of the dry gas residue. The producers
attacked the order on the ground that the Commission lacked
statutory authority to promulgate such a regulation. The Supreme
Court, on direct appeal,2" upheld the district court's grant of a
temporary injunction pending final determination of the cause.
Articles 6014, 6015, and 602924 were construed as conferring
power upon the Commission to make and enforce all regulations
reasonably necessary to prevent waste. The court stated that the
validity of the order, as distinguished from the Commission's
authority to make it, depended upon whether, upon a full devel-
opment of the facts, it was reasonably supported by substantial
evidence and, when so tested, appeared reasonable and just and
its enforcement feasible and practicable.
Article 6014 condemns waste generally as being unlawful,
and specifically includes certain things as constituting waste.
One of the wasteful practices therein enumerated is the oper-
ation of any well with an inefficient gas-oil ratio. The producers
urged that, since the Commission had fixed a ratio for the field,
with which they had complied, the burning of gas within that
22 __TeX. , 206 S. W. (2d) 235 (1947).
2 T Rzv. Cirv. STAT. ANN. (Vernon's 1925) art. 1738a and Rule 499.a, TEx. RuLEs
CMv. Pao., provide for direct appeal to the Supreme Court from any order of any trial
court granting or denying an injunction wherein the constitutionality of a statute or the
validity of an administrative order, issued under any Texas statute, is involved
24 Tax. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. (Vernon's 1925) Art. 6014; Tex. Vernon's Ann. Civ.
Stat. (1925) Art. 6015; TE. Rlv. Civ. STAT. ANN. (Vernon's 1925) Art. 6029.
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ratio could not be wasteful. The court thought it possible for
the practice to be wasteful in certain circumstances. Article 6015
is a broad proscription of waste. Article 6029 authorizes the
Commission to issue regulations to prevent waste:
"(8) It (The Commission) shall do all things necessary for the con-
servation of... oil and ... gas and to prevent the waste thereof, and
siall make and enforce such rules, regulations or orders as may be
necessary to that end."
In the opinion of the court these provisions give authority to,
and impose a responsibility upon the Co ijmission to prescribe
fair and reasonable rules whenever a preventable waste exists
or is imminent, and the types of waste "specifically included"
in Article 6014 are only illustrative, not the limits, of the author-
ity delegated to the Commission by the Legislature. If beneficial
uses were reasonably available and gas were being wastefully
burned, then an order such as this would be valid. If conditions
were such that it would not be reasonably practicable to use the
gas in the manner proscribed, then, the Court said, the order
would not be valid, since the legislative standard would have
been violated.
This order marks the first instance in which the Commission
has undertaken to completely shut down oil wells to prevent
waste of natural gas. However, the construction here given to
the conservation statutes is not new. Article 6029 has been
broadly construed."5 Neither its specific provisions nor those of
Article 6014 are exclusive definitions of waste, or limits upon
the types of orders which the Railroad Commission may issue."'
Article 6008" relates to the conservation of gas alone, but it is
substantially similar in wording to Article 6029. In a case aris-
2 5 Johnson Refinery v. State, 85 S. W. (2d) 948 (Tex. Civ. App. 1935) ; Danciger Oi
& Refining Company v. Railroad Commission, 49S. W. (2d) 837 (Tex. Civ. App. 1932),
reversed on other grounds, 122 Tei. 243, 56 S. W. (2d) 1075 (1933).2
6 Danciger Oil & Refining Company v. Railroad Commission, 49 S. W. (2d) 837
(Tex. Civ. App. 1932); Ivey v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 36 F. Supp. 811, (S. D. TeL 1941).
2T Tz. Rev. Civ. STAT. ANN. (Vernon's 1925) Art. 6008.
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ing thereunder it was said of the conservation laws generally
that, although they are often specific, they are designed to pre-
vent all waste, whether specifically defined or not.2 The decision
in Railroad Commission v. Shell Oil Co. is consonant with these
holdings and adheres to the manifest import of the statutes
concerned.
ADVERSE POSSESSION OF MINERALS CONTINUED BY ONE OUT OF
POSSESSION THROUGH His GRANTEE" OF THE SURFACE
In McLendon v. Comer,29 grantor, iii adverse possession of the
entire fee, both minerals and surface, purported to sever and
convey the surface before title matured under the ten-year statute.
Grantee entered and completed the ten-year period. The court
held that the continued use and claim to the surface by the
grantee inured to the benefit of the grantor in maturing title by
limitation to the mineral estate, since grantee and grantor were
in privity of estate and had a unity of interest as against the
disseized owner.
There is, apparently, no precedent on all fours with this case,
but it is aligned with both the general Texas law of limitations
and that relating peculiarly to minerals.
Adverse possession of land may be acquired by one out of
possession through a tenant30 or an agent.8 1 A trespasser may
satisfy statutory requirements of length of possession by "tack-
ing" the adverse holdings of prior successive trespassers with
whom he is connected by privity of estate. 2 A vendor may assert
limitation by virtue of possession held by his purchaser." Where
there has been no severance before entrance of the trespasser,
29 Corzelius v. Railroad Commission, 182 S. W. (2d) 412 (Tex. Civ. App. 1944).
29 200 S. W. (2d) 427 (Tex. Civ. App. 1947) Ref. n. r. e.
'1o Warren v. Frederichs, 76 Tex. 651, 13 S. W. 643 (1890) ; Harvey v. Humphreys, 178
S. W. (2d) 733 (Tex. Civ. App. 1944) error refused.
s1 Burnham v. Hardy Oil Co., 147 S. W. 330 (Tex. Civ. App. 1912).
32 TEx. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. (Vernon's 1925) Art. 5516.
33 Morris v. Meek, 57 Tex. 385 (1882) ; 2 Tax. Jun. 77, Sec. 40 (1931).
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adverse possession matures limitation title to both surface and
minerals,"4 and severance by the true owner does not interrupt
the running of the statute as to either surface or minerals."
Where the true owner severs the minerals and remains in pos-
session of the surface, his continued possession is not adverse to
the mineral estate retained by his grantor," in the absence of
drilling by the former."
Clements v. Texas Company"' is the basis for many holdings
on mineral limitations. It was there said that:
"... a severance by one in possession, who has not yet matured a
title, does not abandon, limit, or qualify his possession for the purpose
of ripening a title against the true owner out of possession, and that, as
against such disseized owner, the continued possession of a trespasser
after severance, as before, is adverse, and that such possession contin-
ued by either the trespasser or the third person to whom he severs will
mature a title by limitation to the entire tract as against such disseized
owner."39
In the Clements case the trespasser severed and purported to
convey the mineral leasehold interest. However, its language is
broad and seems to wholly support the principal case, wherein
precisely the converse fact situation existed. Analogy to the law
of vendor-purchaser, stated above, also seems in point, and it
is not too far fetched to compare the purported grantee here to
an agent or tenant, for the purposes of this case.
The holding is sound. It was to be expected, and helps to round
out the incomplete series of Texas decisions relating to adverse
possession of mineral interests.
'6 Crawford v. Humble Oil & Refining Co., 150 S. W. (2d) 849 (Tex. Civ. App. 1941).
35 Broughton v. Humble Oil & Refining Co., 105 S. W. (2d) 480 (Tex. Civ. App. 1937),
error refused.
s6 Elliot v. Nelson, 251 S. W. 501 (Tex. Comm. App. 1923) opinion adopted by Su.
preme Court; Green v. West Texas Coal Mining & Developing Co., 225 S. W. 548 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1920) error refused; Henderson v. Chesley, 229 S. W. 573 (Tex. Civ. App.
1921) error refused; Wallace v. Hoyt, 225 S. W. 425 (Tex. Civ. App. 1920) error refused.
3T Lyles v. Dodge, 228 S. W. 316, (Tex. Civ. App. 1921).
a0 273 S. W. 993 (Tex. Civ. App. 1925) error refused.
9 Id. at 1003.
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ADVANCE ROYALTY-BONus-DELAY RENTALS
In Bennett v. Scofield'0 a decedent's executors sought the refund
of an alleged overpayment of a federal income tax assessment.
In 1934 decedent executed a five-year oil and gas lease upon his
separate land, under the terms of which the lessee was given an
option of retaining part of the acreage for an additional period
of fifteen years by making one lump sum payment. In 1939 the
lessee exercised the option, but the parties agreed that payment
should be made in ten annual installments rather than one lump
sum. The executors contended that the annual payments were
delay rentals, constituting community property of decedent and
his surviving spouse, and that, therefore, only one-half their
value was taxable. It was held that the unpaid installments were
"advance royalty," or "bonus," and separate property. Upon
decedent's death their full value could be included as a part of
his gross estate.
"Bonus" is a sum paid or contracted to be paid, in addition
to royalty, as a part of the purchase price of a lease"1 and
represents a part of the market value thereof.42 The sale of an
oil and gas lease is a sale of a part of the land. 8 Therefore, if
the land is separate property, the proceeds of the sale are, under
the principle of mutations, separate property of the owner of
the land. "Delay rentals" are rents which accrue by the mere
lapse of time" and, like other rents, are income. The income
derived from separate property belongs to the community estate.4
Although royalty and bonus are treated as "income" for income
40 74 F. Supp. 453 (W. D. Tex. 1947).
"I State Nat. Bank of Corpus Christi v. Morgan, 143 S. W. (2d) 757 (Tex. Com. App.
1940) opinion adopted; Sheppard v. Stanolind Oil & Gas. Co., 125 S. W. (2d) 643 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1939) error refused.
42 3 SUMMER., OIL AND GAS 346-347 (Perm. ed. 1938).
"3 Stephens County v. Mid-Kansas Oil & Gas Co., 113 Tex. 160, 254 S. W. 290 (1923);
Texas Co. v. Daugherty, 107 Tex. 226, 176 S. W. 717 (1915).
" Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Wilson, 76 F. (2d) 766 (C. C. A. 5th 1935).
45 Arnold v. Leonard, 114 Tex. 535, 273 S. W. 799 (1925).
(Vol. 2
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tax purposes," where the question is not their taxability, but
their ownership, state law controls."
A part of the usual lease is a provision for a primary or
exploratory term which, in the absence of production, deter-
mines the life of the estate.45 Delay rentals are paid for the priv-
ilege of delaying development during that term. 9 Since produc-
tion had not been attained, the lease in Bennett v. Scofield would
have terminated by its own terms in 1939 if the option had not
been exercised by the lessee. The life of the lease was thereby
extended. No payments were to accrue during this new life merely
by virtue of the passage of time in order to delay development.
The payments were to be made for the same purposes that the
original purchase price of the lease was paid. Hence, from oil
and gas standpoint, their classification as bonus seems proper,
irrespective of the principles of federal taxation.
AMBIGUITY IN MINERAL DEEDS--LATE PAYMENT OF DELAY
RENTALS EXCUSED
In Humble Oil & Refining Co. v. Harrison"0 the grantors,
owning an undivided three-fourths mineral interest in land, con-
veyed to the defendant one-half of all the minerals (which would
amount to two-thirds of their three-fourths) subject to two exist-
ing "unless" type oil and gas leases which were owned by the
plaintiff, Humble. Covenants in these prior leases provided that
no change in ownership should impose any additional burden
upon the lessee. Humble construed the conveyance so as to pay
the depository bank, for credit to the grantee, only one-half of
the rentals due on three-fourths of the minerals. The bank mailed
46 Burnet v. Harmel, 287 U. S. 103 (1932) ; Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Wil.
son, 76 F. (2d) 766 (C. C..A. 5th 1935).
4T Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Wilson, Ibid.
8Oil ad Cat 31-A TE. JulL 283 (1947).
49 State v. Magnolia Petroleum Co., 173 S. W. (2d) 186 (Tex. Civ. App. 1943), reu aed
tor ,mt of merit.
S_ Tex.., 205 S. W. (2d) 355 (1947).
1948]
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deposit slips to the defendant which were received well before
the due dates. The defendant remained silent, making no request
for additional payment, but one month after the due date under
one lease, four months after due date under the other, he gave
notice that he considered the payments insufficient, the leases ter-
minated, and of his refusal to accept the tenders. On the next
semi-annual rental date Humble deposited to the defendant's
credit the same proportional amount and offered to make
what it considered an overpayment to satisfy his contentions.
The defendant refused to accept any payment whatsoever and
demanded a release. Humble refused and brought suit to remove
a cloud from and quiet its title. The court held that where a
lessee has, in good faith, made payment in accordance with a
misconstruction of an ambiguous conveyance and the transferee
has notice of the mistake, the latter has a duty to notify the lessee
of the error. Failure to speak estopped the defendant from declar-
ing the lease terminated.
Upon failure of a lessee to either commence drilling or pay
the full amount of delay rentals promptly upon the due date an
."unless" type lease ipso facto terminates."1 If a lessee, under a
divisible lease, fails to properly apportion and pay one of the
owners the lease terminates as to such owner, 2 and in an "unless"
type lease notice of termination is not required, since the estate
terminates automatically by reason of limitations in the grant.58
However, the rules of estoppel may be invoked in respect to
rights and obligations arising out of such instruments.5 Accept-
ance of tardy payment of delay rentals has been held to pre-
51 Humble Oil & Refining Co. v. Mullican, 144 Tex. 609, 192 S. W. (2d) 770 (1946);
Gulf Production Co. v. Continental Oil Co., 139 Tex. 183, 164 S. W. (2d) 488 (1942);
W. T. Waggoner Estate v. Sigler Oil Co., 118 Tex. 509, 19 S. W. (2d) 27 (1929).
52 Walker, The Nature ot Property Interests Created By An Oil and Gas Lease in
Texas, 8 TEx. L. REv. 483, 529 (1930).
53 Pool v. Dunnam, 72 S. W. (2d) 398 (Tex. Civ. App. 1934).
5' Curry v. Texas Co., 18 S. W. (2d) 256 (Tex. Civ. App. 1939) error dismissed; 31A
Tml. JUR. 389,1213 (1947).
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dude a lessor from asserting that the lease terminated, 5 but
failure to make prompt payment is not excused merely because
the failure was unintentional,"6 or for other reasons not amount-
ing to estoppel.
Generally, the courts have been strict in compelling prompt
payment. Thus, in Empire Gas & Fuel Co. v. Saunders"7 the
Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals held that the lessor had no duty to
inform the lessee of its mistake even though the defective ten-
der was made one month in advance. In Coker v. Benjamin" a
Texas court reached a similar result. These cases are distin-
guishable from the Harrison case since the conveyance in both
were not ambiguous.
The Supreme Court, in the principal case, cited those cases as
examples of the strict construction of the rule that an "unless"
lease terminates immediately and irrevocably upon a failure to
comply with its limitations. The court stated, however, that the
rule has been relaxed in some instances. 9 Mr. Justice Hart rea-
soned that the failure to pay the defendant his full share resulted
from (1) Humble's misconstruction of the grantor's ambiguous
instrument and (2) defendant's failure to notify Humble of the
proper construction. He felt that it would, contrary to the terms
of the leases, impose an additional burden upon the lessee to
require it to determine, at its peril, the proper construction of
an instrument to which it was not a patty.
While the Saunders case and Coker v. Benjamin are definitely
5 Mitchell v. Simms, 63 S. W. (2d) 371 (Tex. Comm. App. 1933) ; Cox. v. Miller, 184
S. W. (2d) 323 (Tex. Civ. App. 1944), error refused; McGoy v. Texon Royalty Co., 124
S. W. (2d) 877 (Tex. Civ. App. 1939), error dismissed.
56 Weiss v. Claborn, 219 S. W. 884 (Tex. Civ. App. 1920) error refused.
57 22 F. (2d) 733 (C. C. A. 5th 1927), certiorari dismissed 278 U. S. 581, 49 S. Ct. 184
(1929).
Is83 S. W. (2d) 373 (Tex. Civ. App. 1935).
CO The court cited the following cases: Mitchell v. Simms, 63 S. W. (2d) 371 (Tex.
Comm. App. 1933) (acceptance of payment after due date) ; Miller v. Hodges, 260 S. W.
168 (Tex. Com. App. 1924) (lessee excused from payments during pendency of suit
brought by lessor to cancel lease); Perkins v. Magnolia Petroleum Co., 148 S. W. (2d)
266 (Tea. Civ. App. 1924), writ dismissed, judgment correct (joint deposit in depository
bank of total amount due under separate leases to different lessors held sufficient).
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not overruled, the language of Humble v. Harrison may furnish
a possible basis for further relaxation of the existing rule in the
future. Although, technically, "unless" leases terminate by their
own limitations, the practical result is harsh and closely akin
to forfeiture. It is submitted that a lessor who has actual knowl-
edge of a deficient rental payment, seasonably made through an
innocent mistake, has a duty to speak and that failure to do so
should estop him from asserting termination of the lease even
though the instrument of transfer is ambiguous, provided that
the lessee offers to correct the mistake upon learning thereof.
CONSTRUCTION OF LEASE COVENANTS-LATE PAYMENT OF
DELAY RENTALS
In Benson v. Lacy6" a lease covenant provided that no change
in ownership of the land should increase the obligations or
diminish the rights of the lessee, notwithstanding actual or con-
structive notice to him, or be binding upon him unless or until
thirty days after (1) written notice to lessee from both the lessor
and the lessor's successors, and (2) delivery to the record owner
.of the lease of certified copies of the recorded instruments of
iransfer. All covenants were declared binding upon the heirs,
successors, and assigns of the parties. The lessor conveyed a one-
half undivided mineral interest, subject to the lease, to the plain-
tiff. The latter delivered copies of the recorded assignment to
the defendant lessee, but no written notice was given by either
the plaintiff or the lessor. The defendant paid all delay rentals
to the original lessor and the plaintiff sought cancellation of the
lease as to his interest. The court held that since all require-
ments of the lease were not met, the assignor was not entitled
to cancellation. Parties may contract in any manner agreeable
to them which does not violate the law or contravene public
policy. The additional requirement of notice was not, as con-
tended by the plaintiff, unreasonable and void as against pub-
60 202 S. W. (2d) 690 (Tex. Civ. App. 1947).
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lic policy. Business and prudence dictated that the parties insert
such provisions for their mutual protection. Since the plaintiff
had taken subject to the lease he had assumed the obligations
thereof and was fully bound by its terms.
The decisions show that covenants requiring delivery of copies
of transfer instruments to a lessee are valid conditions precedent
and that if such a covenant is not met the lessee will not be
bound by the transfer."1 Literal compliance with provisions for
written notice has also been required. 2 Delivery of a lessor's
recorded deed does not meet a requirement of written notice to
the lessee from both the lessor and his assignee," and provisions
requiring actual notice are not violative of any law or the pub-
lic policy of this state," since registration statutes do not deprive
parties of the right to contract expressly for the waiver of theirprotection."s
AMBIGUITY IN LEASE ASSIGNMENTS
In Sanford v. Farmer"6 the defendant conveyed unto plaintiff
two fractional interests of the oil and gas in a 7/17 acre tract.
At the time of the assignment there was only one well on the tract
but, subsequently, a second was brought in. The assignment re-
cited that it conveyed:
"... all rights, title and interest... in an undivided one-sixteenth
(1/16) of seven eighths (7/8) working interest, in and to Well No. One
. .. ; and ... an undivided one-thirty-second (1/32) of seven-eighths
(7/8) reversionary working interest, same being a part of one-eighth
(1/8) of seven-eighths (7/8) retained by lessors in the... lease until
s Cassity v. Smith, 193 S. W. (2d) 991 (Tex. Civ. App. 1946), error refused; Hum-
phrey v. Flanagan, 91 S. W. (2d) 449 (Tex. Civ. App. 1936); Jackson v. United Pro-
ducers' Pipe Line Co.. 33 S. W. (2d) 540 (Tex. Civ. App. 1930), error refused; Brandt
v. Roxana Petroleum Corp., 29 F. (2d) 980 (C. C. A. 5th 1929); Oil & Gas, 31-A TM.
Jut. 862 (1947) ; 2 SUMMERS, On. AND GAs 255 (Perm. ed. 1938).
s2 Gulf Refining Co. v. Shatford, 159 F. (2d) 231 (C. C. A. 5th 1947).
as Brandt v. Roxana Petroleum Corp., 29 F. (2d) 980 (C. C. A. 5th 1929).
64 Ibid.
63 Jackson v. United Producers' Pipe Line Co, 33 S. W. (2d) 540 (Tex. Civ. App.
19 0).
"203 S. W. (2d) 996 (Tex. Civ. App. 1947) error reflused.
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lessors... receive Ten Thousand Dollars from the sale of one-eighth
of seven-eighths of the oil... from said well.., said... interest ... to
become effective when the remaining unpaid portion of said Ten Thou-
sand Dollar oil payment shall have been paid; ."..".1 (Italics supplied.)
The interest retained by the lessors ran throughout the entire
tract, but defendants contended that the 1/32 interest conveyed to
plaintiff was limited to Well No. One, as plaintiff admitted the
1/16 interest to be. The court held that the instrument conveyed a
1/32 interest running through the entire tract. The phrase "from
said well" referred only to the date on which plaintiff's interest
was to take effect, and two separate estates in the same land were
conveyed.
The primary object in construing a deed is to ascertain the
intention of the parties," and where the language of a grant is
ambiguous artificial rules of construction are applied by the court
to ascertain, from the language, the apparent intention. One of these
rules is that, since the language of a deed is that of the grantor,
in doubtful cases it will be construed against him and in favor
of the grantee." Also, where an instrument is ambiguous the court
will, if possible, harmonize the parts and construe it so that all
of them may stand. 0 When all the parts are harmonized the instru-
ment will be construed to convey the greatest estate that the terms
of the instrument will permit."
These propositions are well settled. In Sanford v. Farmer the
court based its holding upon the latter two, citing Cartwright v.
Trueblood.2 The case adds nothing to the substantive law, but is
noteworthy as an authoritative holding upon an unusual fact situa-
tion.
6T Id. at 997.
68 14 TEX. JUR. 910,1132 (1931).
69 Cartwright v. Trueblood, 99 Tex. 535, 537, 39 S. W. 930 (1897) ; Curdy v. Stafford,
88 Tex. 120, 123, 30 S. W. 551 (1895) ; Klein v. Humble Oil & Refining Co., 67 S. W. (2d)
911, 914 (Tex. Civ. App. 1934), affirmed 126 Tex. 450, 86 S. W. (2d) 1077 (1935).
70 Associated Oil Co. v. Hart, 277 S. W. 1043, 1044 (Tex. Com. App. 1925).
71 Cartwright v. Trueblood, 99 Tex. 535,39 S. W. 930 (1897).
72 Note 69, supra.
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BREACH OF WARRANTY TRUSTS-AFTER ACQUIRED TITLE-ROYALTY
In Sanders v. MacDonal&8 Sanders conveyed to MacDonald,
warranting title, the entire seven-eighths leasehold interest to cer-
tain land. Later Sanders discovered that he owned only six-sevenths
of the minerals under the tract. He and Stewart agreed to purchase
the remaining one-seventh interest jointly. It was contemplated that
Sanders acquired one-eighth of one-seventh in order to give him
a full one-eighth interest in the tract, and Stewart was to own
the remainder. Sanders was to procure a deed made out to Stewart
and draw a draft upon the latter for the purchase price. He effected
the purchase, stating that he was buying for another person, but,
contrary to the agreement, took a deed in blank and made payments
with a certified check of his own. Shortly thereafter he inserted
Stewart's name as grantee and delivered the deed. The latter
reimbursed him in the proportion of the price which he had agreed
to bear and acknowledged, in writing, that he held one-eighth of
one-seventh "royalty" interest in trust for Sanders. MacDonald
contended that, at the moment Sanders received the blank deed,
title vested in himself by virtue of the failure of his warranty
and the doctrine of after acquired title. The court held that the
doctrine was not applicable to any part of the interest acquired
and that MacDonald's proper remedy was an action for damages.
Where two persons agree to acquire land jointly, one to furnish
all the money and be partly repaid by the other, the one who
acquires legal title holds the undivided interest of the other in
trust.7' The general rule in Texas is that title to land which is
subsequently acquired by a grantor, who has previously purported
to convey the land by a general warranty deed, vests eo instante
in his grantee," but this rule does not apply where the grantor
73 207 S. W. (2d) 155 (Tex. Civ. App. 1947), rel. n. r. e.
T4 Bray v. Clark, 9 S. W. (2d). 203 (Tex. Civ. App. 1928), error dism'd; Jackson v.
Jackson, 258 S. W. 231 (Tex. Civ. App. 1924) ; Johnston v. Johnston, 204 S. W. 469 (Ter.
Civ. App. 1918), error relnsed.
"Baldwin v. Root, 90 Tex. 546, 40 S. W. 3 (1897) ; Fretelliere v. Hinds, 57 Tex. 392
(1882) ; Cherry v. Farmers Royalty Holding Co., 160 S. W. (2d) 908 (Tex. Com. App.
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takes that title in trust, actual or constructive, for a third party."
The reason for the exception is that a purchaser who relies upon
the doctrine of after acquired title can thereby receive no right
greater than that possessed by his grantor." In the present case a
trust attached to Stewart's interest when the blank deed passed to
Sanders. This is an apparent avenue of escape to a grantor who
has breached his warranty and, although able, does not wish to
make it good in land. The same result would have followed had
Sanders conveyed the interest to a bona fide purchaser after
acquiring it,"8 instead of agreeing to a division beforehand, not-
withstanding the well settled principle that title passes to the
grantee at the instant it vests in the grantor."9 However, since
where a grantor owns some title a purchaser cannot be without
notice if the lessee has recorded his lease, ° this method often
will not be available, while there seems to be no barrier to the
method followed in MacDonald v. Sanders unless the person in
Stewart's position is guilty of fraud.
There seems to be only one possible flaw in the holding that,
since Sanders had warranted only the leasehold interest, the
doctrine of after acquired title did not apply to the fractional
interest held in trust for Sanders. Great pains have been taken
by the courts in pointing out that while royalty is an interest in
land, its rights, obligations, and values are quite different from
those of leasehold and other interests." Under a general warranty
the grantor warrants title only to the particular interest which
1942), opinion adopted; Caswell v. Llano Oil Co, 36 S. W. (2d) 208 (Tex. Com. App.
1931).Ts Fretelliere v. Hinds, ibid; Newton v. Easterwood, 154 S. W. 646 (Tex. Civ. App.
1913), error refused.
TT Newton v. Easterwood, ibid.
Is 12 Tcr Ji. 33 (1931); Lindsay v. Freeman, 83 Tex. 259, 18 S. W. 727 (1892).
"o 14 Tax. Juw. 901 (1931).
o Cherry v. Farmers Royalty Holding Co., 160 S. W. (2d) 9( (Tex. Com. App. 1942).




he purports to convey"' and he is not estopped to assert title to
another interest which he subsequently acquires." Therefore, if
the interest which Sanders took was royalty, the holding is sound.
But this is not at all clear. The interest acquired was, in toto, a
mineral interest and, if oil were produced from the land the lessee
would be entitled to deduct one-seventh of his production and
development costs before paying its owners their share.8 ' No such
burden attaches to a "royalty" interest." From the court's state-
ment of the case it seems apparent that Sanders should own a
flat one.eighth of the interest jointly purchased. If this be so, he
acquired a one-fifty-sixth portion of the minerals in and under
the tract.
Mineral interests are the rights from which leasehold interests
are carved. After a mineral owner creates a lease he still has
something left over and this interest is commonly called "royalty."
If the holding here was proper it seems that Sanders would have
an inchoate reversionary interest in Stewart's seven-fifty-sixths,
and that the latter would have only a determinable fee, the same
type of estate which MacDonald took under his lease. It seems
clear that neither Sanders or Stewart intended any such result.
On the contrary, it appears that they intended that Stewart should
take an undivided seven-fifty-sixths fee simple mineral interest.
It does not seem possible for the parties to change the real char-
acter of a mineral interest by merely dubbing it "royalty" when,
in fact, no such interest was ever created.
It is submitted that the court erred in refusing to carry out the
intention of the parties and that the doctrine of after-acquired
title should have been applied to the interest acquired by the
lessor, Sanders.
' Tulley v. Howsley, 176 5. W. (2d) 158 (Tez. Com. App. 1943), opinion adopted;
Wilson v. Wilson. 118 S. W. (2d) 403 (Tex. Civ. App. 1938).
83 Talley v. Howuley, ibid.
84 Watkins v. Slaughter, 183 S. W. (2d) 474 (Tex. Civ. App. 1944), amned, 144 Tci.




In Sinclair Prairie Oil Co. v. Campbell" plaintiff, the partial
assignee of a lease of defendant's land, sought to compel the
defendant to convey a mineral interest to it. The lease provided:
".. . as a part of the consideration herein,... if lessee or assigns has
paid the yearly annual rental as provided herein for the said period of
20 successive years, then ... lessee or assigns is to become the owner in
fee of seven-eighths of all the minerals ... and lessor will execute the
proper legal conveyance to the same....
"If no well be commenced... this lease shall terminate... unless the
lessee... shall pay or tender.., ten cents per acre ... which shall...
cover the privilege of deferring the commencement of a well.., for
twelve months.... In like manner commencement of a well may be
further deferred for like periods....
"Should the first well... be a dry hole... if a second well is not
commenced.., this lease shall terminate ... unless the lessee shall re-
sume the payment of rentals.... .'"T
The plaintiff or its predecessors paid the required rentals for
nineteen years, despite the discovery of oil on a part of the
original leased tract by another partial assignee in 1936. When
plaintiff tendered the twentieth payment defendant rejected it and
refused to execute a conveyance. The court held that the discovery
of oil in 1936 inured to the benefit of all those holding parts of
the original lease and that no further payment of delay rentals
was required. It thought that use of the phrase "as provided
herein" in the lease indicated that the provision for maturing
title was intended to operate only if no oil or gas were produced
and was inserted to compensate the lessee for fruitless rental
payments in such event. When production was attained the lease,
by this construction, no longer provided for payment of delay
rentals. The acceptance of such benefits from 1936 through 1943
was held insufficient to estop the lessor, since the plaintiff's tract
had not been drilled and the court reasoned that the defendant
might well have accepted them under the belief that ,they were




tendered in lieu of the plaintiff's failure to carry out its implied
duty of reasonable development, since the latter had not drilled
a well.
This decision may not seem equitable, but examination dis-
closes that it is supported by rules of construction of long stand-
ing. The purpose in construing a lease is to ascertain the true in-
tention of the parties. This is done by considering all of its parts
and giving effect to each if this can lawfully and reasonably be
done.s8 If possible, the intention must be discovered from the
language used in the instrument,"8 but this rule is subordinate to
the principle that intention prevails, and where an instrument
is ambiguous subsequent conduct of the parties may be resorted
to in determining what that intent was at the time of making the
lease.'" "As provided herein" is subject to two meanings in this
lease. The court adopted the technical one. It might have been
construed to mean that the payment of delay rentals was intended
to both delay development and mature title in fee.
In oil and gas leases it is said that time is of the essence and
the rule that an instrument is to be construed most strongly against
the grantor does not apply."' Instead, a lease will be construed
most strongly against the lessee,' 2 and if the language is suscep-
tible of two constructions the one most faborable to the lessor
will be adopted.'8 Since the plaintiff was not an original party
to the lease his conduct would not seem important, and since
88 Humble Oil & Refining Co. v. Mullican, 144 Tex. 609, 192 S. W. (2d) 770 (1946).
Pendery v. Panhandle Refining Co., 169 S. W. (2d) 766 (Tex. Civ. App. 1943), error re-
fused; Zeppa v. Houston Oil Co., 113 S. W. (2d) 612 (Tex. Civ. App. 1938), error refused.
89 Cowden v. Broderick and Calvert, 108 S. W. (2d) 562 (Tex. Civ. App. 1937),
affirmed, 131 Tex. 434,114 S. W. (2d) 1166 (1938).
90 Flewellen v. Simms, 134 S. W. (2d) 687 (Tex. Civ. App. 1940), reversed on other
grounds; Simms Oil Co. v. Flewellen, 138 Tex. 63, 156 S. W. (2d) 521 (Tex. Com. App.
1941) opinion adopted; Hinson v. Noble, 122 S. W. (2d) 1082 (Tex. Civ. App. 1938);
Zeppa v. Houston Oil Co., 113 S. W. (2d) 612 (Tex. Civ. App. 1938), error refused; 2
SUnMMIs, On. AND GAs 285 (Perm. ed. 1938).
s1 Young v. Jones, 222 S. W. 691 (Tex. Civ. App. 1920).
92 Grubstake Inv. Assn. v. Coyle, 269 S. W. 854 (Tex. Civ. App. 1925), error dism'd;
Stephenson v. Stitz, 255 S. W. 212 (Tex. Civ. App. 1923), error dism'd.
98Zeppa v. Houston Oil Co., 113 S. W. (2d) 612 (Tex. Civ. App. 1938), error refused
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defendant's acceptance of rentals was subject to two interpreta-
tions the holding is tenable under the above rules.
CYCLING OF NATURAL GAS-LESSEE'S IMPLIED COVENANTS
In Tidewater Associated Oil v. Stott"" defendant oil companies
owned extensive leases surrounding land which they held under
lease from plaintiffs. The defendants and their other lessors
entered into unitization and recycling agreements in order to pro-
tect their leases from similar operations by others in the field. The
plaintiffs, although urged to participate on the same basis as the
other lessors, refused to join. It was clearly impracticable to re-
cycle the plaintiff's wells separately, so that the defendants were
able to do no more than to separate condensate at the wells. Since
there was a limited market for the semi-dry gas residue and
because of statutes forbidding flaring, 6 the plaintiffs' wells were
restricted to lower production than those operated by defendants
on adjacent tracts, which were finding ample beneficial uses
for their extracted products. Dry gas, returned to the reservoir at
high pressure after cracking, was replacing wet gas underneath
the plaintiffs' lands by forcing it toward points of lower pres-
sure, those points being those wells which participated ini the
recycling operations and consequently enjoyed greater allow-
ables. This suit was instituted to recover damages for the resulting
loss to the plaintiffs. It was admitted that the defendants had
fully performed their duty to develop these leases, but the plain-
tiffs contended that there is an implied duty upon the lessee to
refrain from injuring his lessor's lease. The court held that if
such a covenant exists, it cannot prevent a lessee from operating
adjacent leases to the advantage of himself and the lessors there
concerned. Plaintiffs could not refuse to cooperate with their
lessees for-their mutual protection and benefit in the manner cus-
tomary in the field, and, at the same time, demand damages.
Any loss which they suffered was damnum absque injuria.
94 159 F. (2d) 174 (C. C. A. 5th 1947), cert. denied, 331 U. S. 817 (1947).
95 Tsx. Rix. CIv. STAT. ANN. (Vernon's 1925) art. 6008, 1 3.
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The leading texts list several convenants which are implied in
oil and gas leases," but none of the authorities find any duty incum-
bent upon a lessee "not to injure his lessor's lease." It has been
suggested that there is an implied duty upon the lessee to do
"everything a reasonably prudent operator should do to insure a
reasonably rapid accrual of the largest royalties practicable, due
consideration being given to the interests of both lessor and
lessee."'" However, none of the authorities cited for this proposi-
tion go any farther than to uphold covenants to develop or to
protect against drainage. Professor Walker contends that there
should be an implied promise that a lessee will use reasonable
care in drilling and operating wells on his lessor's lease, but he
recognizes that even this covenant does not exist."' The only state-
ment which has been discovered supporting the lessors' contention
in the principal case is a dictum in Humphreys Oil Co. v. Tatum9
a federal decision which has been cited with approval in only
one Texas case, and in a dissenting opinion in that instance.1"
The only question involved in the Humphreys case was the scope
of a lessee's duty to drill and protect against drainage from wells
on adjacent tracts owned by the same lessee, and the statement
there made, which seems to support the lessors here, was unsup-
ported and unnecessary to the decision.
A result contrary to the principle case would, without justifica-
tion, decrease the lessee's rights under nearby leases which he
96 (1) To drill test wells; (2) to reasonably develop after discovery of oil or gas; (3)
to drill offset wells so as to protect against drainage. 2 SumvEas, O1. AND GAS 309 (Perm.
ed. (1938) ; Oil and Gas, 31-A Tnx. Jun. 222-238 (1947) ; Twsss, Texas Oil and Gas
177-178 (1929) ; MERiti, Covenants Implied in Oil and Gas Leases 20 (1926). An addi-
tional covenant, to market the product, is listed by Summers and Texas Jurisprudence.
Summers, alone, states that the covenant to drill test wells exists even though the lease
provides for payment of delay rentals, if the lessor gives notice. Thuss contends that a
covenant should not be implied in such cases.
91 Note 25 Tz. L Rv. 690 (1947).
98 Walker, The Nature al the Property Interest Created By An Oil and Gas Lease in
Texas, 11 Tri. L REv. 399, 443 (1933).
99 26F. (2d) 882 (C. C.A. Sth 1928),cert. denied, 278U. S. 633 (1928).
100 Pabst v. Roxana Petroleum Corp., 51 S. W. (2d) SM, 809 (Tex. Cv. App. 1932).
afimed, 125 Ten. 52,80 S. W. (2d) 956 (1935).
1948]
SOUTHWESTERN LAW JOURNAL
might happen to own. It is submitted that a leaseholder's rights
and duties under adjacent leases are separate and distinct and
should not be changed in any manner in which they could not be
changed if the leases were owned by separate persons.
ILLEGAL PRODUCTION-COMMINGLING-WAIVER
In Mooers v. Richardson Petroleum Co.' the defendant com-
pany owned several contiguous leases. The plaintiff owned one-half
the royalty in tract A on which there were large producing wells.
Some of the other leases were not producing their allowables.
The defendant concealed this by constructing secret underground
pipelines, by means of which it illegally overproduced tract A
and supplemented its poor wells, in which the plaintiff had no
interest. The plaintiff was paid one-half the royalty on the re-
ported production of tract A, but none on oil secretly piped away.
The decision raises two points of interest.
First. Since the defendant was unable to show clearly how much
oil was illegally run from tract A, the court held that the plaintiff
was entitled to damages in accordance with the equitable rule of
commingled assets: the value of one-half the royalty on all the
oil produced from all wells which had been secretly connected
with tract A, for the entire period of commingling.
Oil and gas, when physically severed from the land by pro.
duction, become personalty and are, after severance, generally
subject to the same principles of law as other chattels. The court
here merely applied the equitable rules relating to wilful confu-
sion of goods. A similar principle is applied where trustees com-
mingle many types of goods,'"2 but none of the cases cited by
either the Supreme Court or the Court of Civil Appeals... in the
10, ...... Tex .... 204 S. W. (2d) 606 (1947).
102 Eaton v. Husted, 141 Tex. 349, 172 S. W. (2d) 493 (1943) (lease bonus money);
Holloway Seed Co. v. Bank, 92 Tex. 187, 47 S. W. (95) (1898) (seeds and grain) ; John-
son v. Hocker, 39 S. W. 406 (Tex. Civ. App. 1897) (cattle); Union Naval Stores v.
United States, 202 Fed. 491 (C. C. A. 5th 1913), affirmed in 240 U. S. 284 (1915) (naval
stores).
10 201 S. W. (2d) 134 (TeL Civ. App. 1946).
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Mooers case involved commingling of oil and gas. Research yields
only one decision in point,'" a very similar "hot oil" case. There
the court refused to apply the rule of wilful confusion to increase
a lump sum of damages awarded by the jury. Although the evi-
dence would have supported a verdict in greater amount and
although the exact amount of damages could not be determined,
the court, expressly declining to decide whether the rule might
be applied in different circumstances, held that the evidence was
such that the jury could form a reasonably certain estimate of the
amount of oil converted and that, therefore, the rule was not
applicable, despite the fact that the verdict arrived at was clearly
very conservative. In the principal case it was found to be impos-
sible to establish "clearly and distinctly" the amount of "hot oil"
run. The decisions are not, therefore, conflicting on principle.
Since there is no reason apparent why any different rule should
apply to oil and gas than to other fungible goods, the holding
seems proper.
Second. If, contrary to the findings of the trial court, a right
to terminate the lease had ever existed, it had been waived. After
knowledge of the fraud plaintiff continued to accept royalty pay-
ments from defendant. His original petition in this suit prayed
for damages and the foreclosure of a lien upon the leasehold
estate. In connection therewith he had filed notice of lis pendens.
It was held that the plaintiff's knowledge at the time of suit put
him to an election to either affirm the lease and sue for damages,
or repudiate it and sue for termination. His actions were incon-
sistent with an intent to terminate and constituted an aflirmance
of the lease.
The principle here invoked is that of equitable estoppel. It is
well settled that an irrevocable election to pursue one remedy
thereafter bars a suit asking for another and inconsistent form of
relief.""5 Acceptance of the benefits of the lease, the royalty checks,'
104 Ortiz Oil Co. v. Luttes, 141S. W. (2d) 1050 (Tex. Civ. App. 1940), eror dismised.
105 Seamans Oil Co. v. Guy, 115 Tex. 93, 276 S. W. 424 (1925); Roseabaum v. Texas
Bldg. & Mrtg. Co., 167 S. W. (2d) 506 (Tex. Com. App. 1943), opio adopted; Fleming
1948]
SOUTHWESTERN LAW JOURNAL
indicated that the plaintiff recognized the lease as subsisting and
continuing. His original prayer asking a lien and foreclosure
strengthened this inference and this latter, along with notice of
lis pendens, undoubtedly had an injurious effect upon defendant's
leasehold interest, thus making the election irrevocable. 1"
A distinction should be noted between waiver, of which the
court speaks, and equitable estoppel, the true basis of the case,
since the elements of those defenses are not synonymous.' 7 The
result, however, is sound.
SALE 'BY GuARDIN OF MINERALS APART FROM SURFACE
Article 4195a, R.C.S. 1925, authorizes the sale of non-produc-
tive real estate by guardians. Research indicates that Henderson
v. Shell Oil Co.1"s is a case of first impression. It interprets the
statute to "clearly" authorize a guardian to convey the minerals
under his ward's lands separately and apart from the surface.
There are numerous cases concerning the power of guardians
to make oil and gas leases; it is generally held that an oil and gas
lease amounts to a sale of a part of the corpus of the land.'"
Texas (among other states) has passed a statute'" giving and
regulating the power of guardians to make such leases. But in
Texas, however, there is no statute expressly authorizing guardians
to make an absolute conveyance of the mineral estate and there
are, apparently, no cases on this point. Nevertheless, the result
of the principal case was logically to have been expected in view
of analogous decisions and the wording of the statute.
v. Lon Morris College, 85 S. W. (2d) 276 (Tex. Civ. App. 1935), error relused; Chap-
man v. Guaranty State Bank, 297 S. W. 545 (Tex. Civ. App. 1916), error reussed; 2
B.,cK, RcissION AND CANCU.LATION, 1 594, 596 (1929).t0 Seamans Oil Co. v. Guy, ibid.
107 Vaiver, 43 Tot. Jm. 1 3, 893, 894 (1936).
108 202 S. W. (2d) 492 (Tex. Civ. App. 1947) error granted, affirmed, - Tex. -- , 208
S. W. (2d) 863 (1948). The Supreme Court did not discuss this particular point, but
stated that each question of law presented to the court of Civil Appeals was correctly
decided by the latter.
109 2 Suxums. O AND GAs 4 (Perm. ed. 1938).
1'o R. C. S. Art. 4192.
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It is elementary Texas oil and gas law that those minerals are,
while in place, a part of the realty and that whenever they are
conveyed the conveyance of an interest in realty results;... also,
Texas decisions in some instances construe a power of sale as
including the power to make oil and gas leases. For instance, in
Theisen v. Robison"'3 a constitutional provision authorizing the
legislature to provide for the sale of University lands was held
to warrant passage of statutes allowing mineral leases on such
land. A constitutional provision relating to county school lands
was similarly construed in Eldinger v. Clark.11' The power granted
private corporations... to sell, mortgage, or otherwise convey real
property is held to authorize mineral leases."' The leading case,
Avis v. First National Bank of Wichita Falls,"' held that a broad
power of management, sale, control, rental, and lease in a testa-
mentary trust empowered a trustee to make oil and gas leases.
This was the authority relied upon by the court in the Henderson
case.
The only cases contrary to the above decisions are those con-
struing the scope of powers of attorney. The leading case of Bean
v. Bean held that a naked power of attorney to "bargain, sell,
grant and convey" land did not include the power to make oil
leases. The Supreme Court, in the Avis case, distinguished and
refused to apply this holding on the ground that powers of attorney
are construed strictly, while wills are interpreted liberally. It is
generally thought that the Avis case limits Bean v. Bean to situa-
tions involving powers of attorney. However, it should be noted
that, in the Avis case, the court limited its holding to the circum-
stances involved.
111 Texas Co. v. Daugherty, 107 Tex. 226, 176 S. W. 717 (1915).
112 117 Tex. 489, 8 S. W. (2d) 646 (1928).
Ill 117 Tex. 547, 8 S. W. (2d) 666 (1928).
114 By R. C. S. Art. 651.
115 Starke v. J. M. Guffey Petroleum Co, 98 Tex 542,86 S. W. 1 (19M).116 141 Tex. 489,174 S. W. (2d) 255 (1943).
'T 79 S. W. (2d) 652 (Te. Cir. App. 1935) rm reousiw&
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Nicholson v. Campbell'" decided prior to the enactment of
Article 4195a, held that if the land of a minor could be sold to
better advantage by dividing it into lots there was no reason to
prevent the division. The statute expressly authorizes this by
providing for the sale of non-productive real estate "in whole or
in part." Since oil and gas in place are a part of the realty and
since the statute allows the sale of a part thereof, the holding in
Henderson v. Shell Oil Co. appears to be clearly correct.
1947 STATUTES
Interstate Oil Compact. The Governor of Texas is authorized
to execute an agreement with other member states of the Inter-
state Oil Compact Commission extending the Interstate Compact
to Conserve Oil and Gas for a period of four years from its ex-
piration date (September 1, 1947), subject to the approval of
Congress.119
State Leases. An act was passed changing the terms of leases
to be made upon state lands, including river beds, channels, un-
sold school lands, and all tidewater lands within the jurisdiction
o the State of Texas, and providing that, for an additional con-
sideration, existing leases upon such lands may be amended so as
to benefit by the new terms. The act extends to all minerals except
metals and provides that said leases are to be granted for a pri-
mary term of five years and as long thereafter as oil, gas, or other
mineral covered is produced.
Before amendment, the law provided that leases on the lands
covered should be limited to a period of twenty-five years even
though production was continuing at the end of such period. In
the purpose clause, Section 5, the legislature states its reasons
for the change: a limited period encourages rapid depletion and
wasteful production practices, and makes leases unattractive to
bidders, thus reducing proceeds received from such leases and
thereby depriving the Public School Fund of substantial revenue.
11s 40 S. W. 167 (Tex. Civ. App. 1897) error relused.
119 Tex. Laws 1947, c. 52, p. 69.
(Vol. 2
OIL AND GAS
Also, the legislature felt that the wasteful practices encouraged
by the limited period might be seized upon by the Federal gov-
ernment as a basis for asserting that the state's control of tide-
water areas is inconsistent with the Federal government's con-
servation program.1 2
0
Use of Natural Gas for Production of Carbon Black. Article
6008a, Section 3121 was amended to authorize the use of sweet
gas for the production of carbon black under certain enumerated
circumstances. The Railroad Commission is authorized to hold
hearings and determine whether the conditions of the act are
being met. The act is cumulative of existing laws covering uses
of gas and all prior conflicting laws are repealed except Sub-
division 2, Section 7, of Article 6008.122
Corporations for Fighting Well Fires and Blowouts. Corpora-
tions may now be formed to carry on the business of fighting
fires and blowouts in oil and gas wells- Certain other types of
corporations are authorized to hold stock in such new corpora-
tions.23' h1
Production of Natural Gas. Article 6008, Sections 12, 14 and
16 are amended. Section 12 makes it the duty of the Railroad
Commission to determine the status of gas production from all
reservoirs in the state, to prorate and regulate production so as
to prevent waste and to prevent production from exceeding markpt
demand. Allowables are to be set each month after hearings pro-
vided for by the Act. Section 14 provides that, in certain circum-
stances, exceptions to Commission orders may be granted in order
to adjust correlative rights where the market is seasonal or fluctu-
ating. Section 16 makes it unlawful for any person to produce
gas from gas wells in violation of valid orders of the Railroad
Commission.12  IF'. L. P. Jr.
120 Tei Laws 1947, c. 82, p. 139.
L21 TEL. REV. Civ. STAT. (Vernon's Supp. 1947), art. 6008, 13, as amended 1932.
122 Tex. Laws, 1947, c. 351, p. 695.
123 Tax. Laws 1947, c. 408, p. 954.
124 Tex. Laws 1947, c. 453, p. 1059.
